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Corporate Probation Under the New
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
Christopher A. Wray
Bitter controversy greeted the United States Sentencing Commission
(Commission) when it introduced the first drafts of sentencing guidelines for
organizational defendants in the summer of 1988.1 Companies predicted un-
precedented incursions into corporate autonomy, while public interest groups
complained of inadequate deterrence.2 Three years and four drafts after its first
proposal, the Commission submitted a final version of these guidelines to
Congress,3 which went into effect on November 1, 1991. Among the more
controversial provisions is a broad corporate probation scheme that confers
significant authority on federal courts to monitor convicted companies and to
force them to develop internal programs to prevent and detect misconduct
So dramatic are these provisions that one former prosecutor remarked:
1. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Discussion Draft of Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statementsfor
Organizations, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 7 (1988); John C. Coffee, Jr. et al., Standards for Organizational
Probation: A Proposal to the United States Sentencing Commission, 10 WHITIER L. REV. 77 (1988).
2. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
3. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,762,22,786-97
(1991) (proposed May 16, 1991) [hereinafter Guideline Amendments].
4. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8D1.1-.5 (1992)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The sanction of "corporate probation" is hard to define briefly. In barest terms,
corporate probation describes a period during which a company must satisfy certain conditions and must
keep the court apprised of its compliance. Such conditions might include restitution, community service,
a remedial order, adverse publicity, or forced internal reforms in corporate structure and decisionmaking.
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The next time a nominee for a federal judgeship appears for Senate
confirmation, the Judiciary Committee should add to the list of legal
qualifications whether the candidate can run General Motors, or Alcoa,
or Nynex. If the U.S. Sentencing Commission's draft guidelines for
corporate criminal sanctions become law this year, the judge might
wind up managing a major corporation.5
This anomaly reflects the curious and complicated nature of the corporation
as a criminal defendant.6 A corporation may be vicariously criminally liable
for the acts or omissions of any of its employees. Moreover, many corporate
crimes neither require criminal intent8 nor involve morally blameworthy con-
duct.9 The new guidelines extend such eccentricities to the field of sentencing.
Probation has historically meant conditional liberty from incarceration, per-
mitting the rehabilitation of the defendant under a probation officer's supervi-
5. Victoria Toensing, Corporations on Probation: Sentenced to Fail, LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1990, at
21; see also L Gordon Crovitz, Vindictive Corporate Punishments Toss Stockholders Into Stockades, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 13, 1991, at A17; Barbara Franklin, Get Ready for Guidelines: Clients Are Urged to Take
Compliance Seriously, N.Y. L.L, Oct. 17, 1991, at 5.
6. Problems of definition plague this field. "Business crime" describes "a crime committed during the
normal course of business operations, for economic reasons, by or on behalf of a legitimate business
organization." HARRY FIRST, BUsINEss CRIME, at xxi (1990). The term "white-collar crime" has enjoyed
a variety of applications and is "a distinctively social, rather than legal, concept, one suffused with vagueness
and ambiguity." Stanton Wheeler, White-Collar Crime: History of an Idea, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND JUSTICE 1652, 1652 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). This Note focuses specifically on the punishment
of "corporate crime": the punishment of organizations, not individual offenders.
The degree to which criminal behavior pervades this nation's companies remains unclear. The
increasing criminalization of economic activity has meant more crimes, more prosecutions, and more
convictions. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Study of Social Harm and
Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1984-87, 26 AM. CRIM. L REV. 605, 606 (1989) (1283
corporations convicted of federal crimes from 1984 to 1987); Corporate Crime by US Companies, Bus.
L. BRIEF, May 1990 (62% of Fortune 500 "were involved" in antitrust, bribery, environmental offenses,
or fraud in 1975-1984); Irwin Ross, How Lawless are Big Companies?, FORTUNE, Dec. 1, 1980, at 56, 58(11% of Fortune's 800 largest companies have been convicted). See generally MARSHALL B. CLINARD &
PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME (1980) (broad sociological study). On the wave of corporate criminal
legislation, see, e.g., 1 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRMINAL LIArILITY § 1:01 (1984); Leonard
Orland, The Proliferation of Corporate Crime Legislation, 1 CORP. CRIM. LIABLrrY REP. 29 (1987).
7. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909), firmly established
the criminal liability of a corporation for the acts or omissions of its agents within the scope of their
employment. Such liability applies even to a company's lowest ranking agents, and the acts in question need
not have benefited the company. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127-28 (5th Cir.
1962). Furthermore, the agent need not have been acting within his express authority. E.g., Continental
Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 149-51 (6th Cir. 1960) (apparent authority sufficient to impose
criminal liability on corporation). Indeed, a corporation may be held liable for acts its agents commit against
company policy. E.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). Moreover, a corporation may be convicted of crimes requiring knowledge
on the basis of the "collective knowledge" of its employees, even if no single employee had the requisite
knowledge. E.g., United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 943 (1987). Like a corporation, a partnership may be criminally liable instead of, or in addition to,
its members. See, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
8. See, e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978) (strict criminal liability
imposed on corporation under Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
9. Many corporate crimes are mala prohibita, notmala in se, offenses: regulatory or reporting violations
often involve "morally neutral" conduct. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5322 (1988) (authorizing criminal
penalties for failure to file currency transaction report). See generally Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations
on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963).
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sion.10 Yet unlike individuals, organizations cannot be sent to jail. To apply
probation to corporations, then, the Commission had to twist the meaning of
the sentence to account for the peculiarity of the corporate defendant.
This Note examines both the rationale and the likely effects of the contro-
versial probation guidelines and argues that the Commission should amend the
guidelines to limit the use of corporate probation to only the most extraordinary
situations. Part I identifies two schools of thought on corporate punishment and
examines their implications for corporate probation. Part II traces the evolution
of corporate probation to its present form, in the new guidelines. Part m
examines the corporate probation guidelines in the context of their statutory
mandate and in juxtaposition with existing administrative and civil sanctions.
Part IV concludes with a proposal to the Commission for limiting the use of
corporate probation.
I. Two MODELS INFLUENCING CORPORATE PROBATION
The last thirty years have witnessed the emergence of two primary views
of corporate punishment, which I will call "the Economic Model" and "the
Structural Reform Model." Contrasting these two models highlights the most
important issues raised by corporate probation under the new guidelines.
The Economic Model relies heavily on a "notion of the criminal as a
rational [cost-benefit] calculator." 1 If this portrait is ever accurate, it is so in
the context of the corporate criminal defendant. Business firms are more
predictably profit-motivated than individuals; corporations respond to profit
incentives and disincentives in decisionmaking.1 2 When collectible, fines
provide disincentives to break the law.13 Fines also compensate society and
punish offenders, at a relatively low cost to society. 4 In contrast, nonmonetary
sanctions less accurately reflect the costs to society from the offense and
10. See Don M. Gottfredson, Probation and Parole: Release and Revocation, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 1247, 1247-54.
11. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 206 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS]. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ANITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 225-26 (1976)
[hereinafter POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW]; Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL ECON. 169 (1968); Jeffrey S. Parker, Criminal Sentencing Policy for Organizations: the Unifying
Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 513 (1989); Richard Posner, Optimal Sentences for
White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, Optimal Sentences].
12. See Parker, supra note 11, at 522-23.
13. See, e.g., Posner, Optimal Sentences, supra note 11, at 414; cf. Parker, supra note 11, at 585-86
(discussing limitation on fines where offender unable to pay, but suggesting "criminal system has traditional-
ly been overly conservative in assessing the ability to pay").
14. See Becker, supra note 11, at 193-94, 208; cf. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 361-62 (1968) (suggesting reliance on criminal sanctions may be misplaced and "monetary
exactions" are most appropriate sanctions); Kadish, supra note 9 (questioning wisdom of using criminal
sanctions to punish what is often "morally neutral" corporate conduct); Developments in the Law-Corporate
Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1227, 1366 (1979)
[hereinafter Developments] ("A system of fines imposed on corporations ... should adequately deter illegal
corporate activity as long as the fines are large enough to force the corporation to disgorge all benefit gained
from illicit conduct.").
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consume social resources in the supervision and rehabilitation of the offend-
er.15 Viewed from the Economic Model, corporate probation suffers from the
ills of other nonmonetary sanctions: heavy administrative and supervisory costs,
attenuated connection to profit incentives, less accurate measuring of monetary
harm, and interference with the competitive process. 6 This model rejects inter-
vention to reform the company and questions "why the government is in a
better position than the firm to provide the solution.... If the organization has
difficulty in controlling its own agents because of bureaucracy, then there is
no reason to believe that adding another layer of governmental bureaucracy has
any potential for solving that problem., 17 The Economic Model, then, suggests
using fines in lieu of corporate probation, unless collection presents a problem.
The Structural Reform Model presents a sharp contrast to the Economic
Model.'8 This model views the corporate offender not as a rational, profit-
maximizing calculator, but as a complex entity in which subunits, auxiliary
divisions, and middle managers pursue their own "subgoals," which often clash
with the aims of the corporation as a whole. 19 This fragmentation of corporate
goals occurs where, for instance, unit managers circumvent environmental or
product-safety standards in order to increase their units' productivity, an
increase that they expect will, in turn, advance their own careers. Fines, this
model suggests, fail to deter many corporate offenders because the fines are
either too low or are passed on to consumers, shareholders, and employees.20
Thus diluted, fines provide an inadequate incentive for internal reforms in the
company's compliance policies and incentive structure.2' According to the
Structural Reform Model, the government must resort to measures that will
directly penetrate the bureaucratic web.22 Corporate probation is the primary
15. See Becker, supra note 11, at 194; see also POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 11, at 225-26;
Posner, Optimal Sentences, supra note 11, at 410.
16. See Parker, supra note 11, at 572.
17. Id. at 573.
18. This model has emerged primarily through the works of Professors John Coffee, Brent Fisse, and
Christopher Stone. See, e.g., BRENT FIsSE & PETER A. FRENCH, CORRIGIBLE CORPORATIONS AND UNRULY
LAW (1985); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR (1975); John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing
Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141 (1983);
cf. Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong.,
2d Seass. 279-301 (1976) (statement of Prof. Christopher Stone). Professor Richard Gruner appears to have
joined the Coffee-Fisse-Stone triumvirate and has offered perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of
structural reform through corporate probation. See Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organiza-
tion: Sanctioning Corporate Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 AM. . CRIM. L. 1 (1988); cf. infra
note 68 and accompanying text (Gruner joined Coffee and Stone to draft earliest, most aggressive corporate
probation proposal to Sentencing Commission).
19. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 18, at 43-46; Coffee, supra note 18, at 393-400; Fisse, supra note
18, at 1216; Simeon M. Kriesberg, Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85
YALE LJ. 1091 (1976) (applying governmental organization models to corporate criminals).
20. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 18, at 388407; Fisse. supra note 18, at 1217-21.
21. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 18, at 40-41; Fisse, supra note 18, at 1217.
22. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 18, at 121; Coffee, supra note 18, at 459; Fisse, supra note 18, at
1245; Gruner, supra note 18, at 72.
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criminal law vehicle of this model's adherents. They have advocated a variety
of probationary conditions, including community service,23 adverse publici-
ty,24 equity (i.e., stock) fines,25 and, most importantly, internal corporate
changes.2
Neither model presents a complete guide for the use of corporate probation.
The Structural Reform Model perceives two main problems with corporate
fines: overspill to innocent parties and defects in corporate incentive structures.
Yet the Economic Model has responses to both problems if fines are set high
enough. First, a company will generally not avoid the brunt of a high fine by
merely passing it on to consumers, shareholders, and employees. Overspill to
these parties produces uncompetitive prices, declining share value, and the loss
of productive employees: "[T]he pass-through problem can exist only if one
believes that a firm, having received a criminal fine, will then proceed to shoot
itself in the foot by impairing its own ability to pay the fine and generate future
profits."27 Second, a company will generally reform its incentive structure in
response to monetary sanctions. High fines will force firms to change the
criteria for career advancement to include compliance with the law because
permitting the conflicting incentives to survive would become prohibitively
expensive.2 Only where upper management ignores these consequences-and
yet retains control of the company-will high fines fail to produce reform. Ap-
propriate fines, however, may sometimes exceed a company's ability to pay.
Where collection is a problem, interventionist probation may both deter future
misconduct and promote structural reform. In sum, high fines will address
almost all corporate crimes, but courts may need the weapon of probation for
two exceptional scenarios: where collectibility is in question or where, through
recidivism, a company proves unresponsive to monetary penalties.
23. See, e.g., Fisse, supra note 18, at 1226-29, 123943; Gruner, supra note 18, at 38-41.
24. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 18, at 424-34; Fisse, supra note 18, at 1229-31, 1239-43.
25. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 18, at 413-24; Fisse, supra note 18, at 1233-34, 1235-37.
26. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 18, at 134-227 (mandatory reforms in selection and maintenance of
board of directors, injection of personnel into company to monitor compliance, "disqualification" of key
personnel, controls on corporate internal information processes, and transfer of more decisions to board of
directors); Coffee, supra note 18, at 448-57 (court-appointed experts to monitor company's internal reporting,
compliance, and discipline mechanisms, and "judicially initiated realignment of the manager's self-interest");
Fisse, supra note 18, at 1221-26, 1237-38 ("managerial intervention"); Gruner, supra note 18, at 71-105
("judicial intervention in internal corporate processes as a corporate probation strategy").
27. Parker, supra note 11, at 573; see also Comment, Increasing Community Control over Corporate
Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE U. 280,285 n.17 (196 1) (refuting "passing on" objec-
tion to fines). Even a firm with a monopoly will not be able to pass on the costs of the fine: the firm is
already charging the highest price it can, see POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 11, at 252; if it
could afford to raise prices any further, it would already have done so.
28. See, e.g., Vineeta AnandA New Emphasis On Ethics Is Catching On In Business, INVESTOR'S Bus.
DAILY, Oct. 10, 1991, at 10 (prospect of higher fines under guidelines pushing firms to develop ethics
programs); Barnaby L Feder, Helping Corporate America Hew to the Straight and Narrow, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1991, at FS ("Companies are fighting the high cost of misconduct with ethics programs.").
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II. EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE PROBATION
A. Corporate Probation Before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
Until 1987, the Federal Probation Act governed corporate probation .29 This
statute permitted a sentencing court to suspend the execution of a sentence and
impose probation "when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest
of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby."30 The court
could not impose a probation term of more than five years, and could design
such conditions "as the court deem[ed] best," specifically including the payment
of fines and restitution "to aggrieved parties." '31
Although the Federal Probation Act neither embraced nor excluded corpo-
rate defendants expressly, courts were reluctant to place corporations on
probation. The Seventh Circuit broke this trend in United States v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. 2 Atlantic Richfield pleaded nolo contendere to the charge of
dumping oil into the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal. The district court had
suspended the statutory fine and placed the company on probation for six
months. In fashioning probation, the court ordered Atlantic Richfield to "set
up and complete a program within 45 days to handle oil spillage into the soil
and/or stream" and threatened, if the company failed to meet this condition, to
appoint a "Special Probation Officer with powers of a Trustee under supervision
of the court" to oversee compliance.33 The Seventh Circuit, although agreeing
with the district court that the Federal Probation Act extended to corporate
defendants, found the particular conditions imposed to be well beyond the
authority conferred by the Act. 4
Following the Atlantic Richfield decision, district courts began to place
corporations on probation more frequently.35 But like the Seventh Circuit in
that case, the courts of appeals repeatedly constrained the sentencing courts'
discretion under the Act.36 The debate centered on monetary conditions of
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1982), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 212(aXl)-(2), 98 Stat. 1987, 1987. Probation is authorized only by statute. See Ex parte United States,
242 U.S. 27 (1916).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
31. Id.
32. 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972).
33. Id. at 59.
34. Id. at 61.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (enforcing
probation condition requiring bakery companies to donate fresh baked goods to specified charitable organiza-
tions); United States v. J.C. Ehriich Co., 372 F. Supp. 768 (D. Md. 1974) (placing company that pleaded
nolo contendere on five-year probation under which it would have to pay maximum fine if convicted of
similar misconduct during that period).
36. The courts of appeals generally rejected corporate probation conditions under the Federal Probation
Act. See United States v. Interstate Cigar Co., 801 F.2d 555 (1st Cir. 1986) (both probation and maximum
fine); United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1984) (charitable contribution);
United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984) (endowment of ethics chair
at state university); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984) (charitable
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probation, as several district courts attempted to make charitable contributions
conditions of probation, while the courts of appeals read the Probation Act as
limiting judges to either fines or restitution to identifiable victims. These cases
acknowledged the Act's broad grant of discretion to the sentencing judge, but
stressed the limitation "'that the conditions have a reasonable relationship to
the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public.' ' 37 Moreover,
like other probationers, companies always had the option of rejecting the
probation and submitting instead to the statutorily defined sentence, the fine.38
Finally, the courts of appeals guarded against the use of probation as a device
to circumvent the statutory caps on monetary penalties.3 9 This need to curb
district courts' discretion in corporate sentencing, however, illustrated the
general problem with indeterminate sentencing.
B. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
In 1984, after years of complaints about indeterminate sentencing, Congress
passed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA). ° This statute significantly reformed
the law of sentencing, including probation. Although courts continued to
sentence corporations under the Federal Probation Act until November 1,
1987,41 the SRA authorized the creation of the Federal Sentencing Commis-
sion and the promulgation of sentencing guidelines.
The SRA's sweeping structural changes reflect a conscious shift in congres-
sional sentencing philosophy. Where pre-SRA law stressed rehabilitation as
sentencing's primary purpose, 42 the SRA explicitly endorses four sentencing
goals of equal priority:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
contributions); United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir. 1982) (same); United States v.
Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1976) (contribution to county alcoholism
council). But see United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding probation
requiring three companies to "lend" high-level executives' services to charity for one year without compensa-
tion and to pay contributions to same charity); United States v. Nu-Triumph, Inc., 500 F.2d 594 (9th Cir.
1974) (upholding probation requiring company not to distribute pornography).
37. Prescon, 695 F.2d at 1242 (quoting Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971)).
38. See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 677 F.2d at 789 ("If the appellants believe that the terms of probation are
more punitive than the fines, they have the option to avoid them by paying the fines." (emphasis added));
PAUL F. CROMWELL Er AL, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 37 (2d ed. 1985)
(citing "[g]eneral rule" that probation cannot be imposed without defendant's consent).
39. See, e.g., Clovis Retail Liquor, 540 F.2d at 1390-91; Atlantic Richfield, 465 F.2d at 61.
40. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-
3566,3571-3574,3581-3586 (1988), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)). See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973) (criticizing indeterminate sentencing).
41. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(aX1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2031 (1984), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note
(1988).
42. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3221 ("In the Federal system today, criminal sentencing is based largely on an outmoded rehabilitation
modeL").
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(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.4 3
The SRA adds two more factors to these four traditional punishment
objectives: "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defen-
dants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct" and
"the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense."" Perhaps most
importantly, the SRA treats probation as a sentence in its own right, rather than
as an alternative to or suspension of another sentence.45
The SRA authorizes the sentencing of an organization to either a term of
probation, a fine, or both.4 In the context of corporate punishment, the SRA's
legislative history reveals an emphasis on increased fines and a conservative
approach to probationary conditions. Complaining that "fines generally have
been an inappropriately under-used penalty in American criminal law," the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee stressed that the SRA "makes major advances in using
the mechanism of fines as an effective sanction for white collar crime and other
highly profitable criminal offenses."47 Consequently, "[tlhe fine levels set forth
in the subsection [§ 3571(b)] are considerably higher than those generally
authorized by current law, and are designed to establish an effective scale for
pecuniary punishment and deterrence that will reflect current economic reali-
ties."48 The SRA specifically sets corporate fines higher than fines for individ-
uals, "both because the organization is likely to have more money available to
it and because the sentence for an organization obviously cannot include a term
of imprisonment."49 The increased fine levels, it was predicted, "would usually
reach the defendant's illgotten gains while avoiding undue complexity in the
sentencing hearing."50
In drafting the SRA's probation provisions, the Committee sympathized
with business groups' concerns that a probation condition prohibiting a compa-
ny from engaging in a particular business "might encourage misapplication to
a business that had committed a regulatory offense but that was otherwise a
legitimate business."5' Indeed, the drafters explicitly cautioned against exces-
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988).
44. Id. § 3553(a)(6)-(7).
45. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 42, at 88, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3271. This treatment
of probation departed from pre-SRA law, which left defendants the option of rejecting probation and
submitting to the statutorily defined sentence (usually incarceration for individuals, fines for corporations).
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c) (1988).
47. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 42, at 103, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3286.
48. Id. at 105-06, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3288-89 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 106, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3289.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3252.
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sive judicial supervision: "It is not the intent of the Committee that the courts
manage organizations as a part of probation supervision .... . 52 Section
3563(b) specifically requires the sentencing judge to impose only probation
conditions that are "reasonably related" to the purposes of sentencing set forth
in the Act, and that "involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as
are reasonably necessary [for those purposes]. 53
The Sentencing Commission avoided these issues when it implemented the
first sentencing guidelines in November 1987.- 4 With the exception of the
guidelines specifically addressing antitrust violations,55 the 1987 guidelines
do not apply to organizations. Moreover, the 1987 antitrust guidelines provide
only for corporate fines and not corporate probation.
Into this limbo stepped District Judge Robert Doumar. In United States v.
Allegheny Bottling Co.,56 he faced the price-fixing conviction of the Allegheny
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company. He sentenced the corporation to a $1 million fine
and three years imprisonment. "The key to corporate imprisonment," wrote
Judge Doumar, "is this: imprisonment simply means restraint."57 He depicted
a scenario in which the U.S. Marshal would seize the company's assets, close
and guard its physical plant, and limit the comings and goings of employees.58
"Who am I to say that imprisonment is impossible when the keeper indicates
that it can physically be done?" he asked.59 He then suspended all but $50,000
of the fine, suspended execution of the sentence of imprisonment, and placed
the company on probation for three years.' Judge Doumar required, "[a]s
special conditions of the probation," that Allegheny provide four executives,
"of comparable salary and stature" to four former executives involved in the
price fixing, to perform forty hours per week of community service for one-
and two-year periods. 61 In addition, he ordered Allegheny not to "dispose of
any of its franchises, capital assets or plants or facilities" in the areas in which
the price-fixing conspiracy had occurred without his specific permission.62 He
characterized his decision as consistent with the purposes of sentencing-incap-
acitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and just punishment-that the Sentencing
52. Id. at 99, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3282 (seeking to "allay the fears of such disparate
groups as the ACLU and the Business Roundtable that probation conditions might be too restrictive in a
particular case or might involve more supervision than is justified").
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (1988).
54. U.S.S.G., supra note 4. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,412 (1989), the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Commission and the Sentencing Guidelines.
55. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 2RI.I.
56. 695 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd in part & rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Harford,
1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,386 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989).
57. Id. at 859-60.
58. Id. at 861.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 858.
61. Id. at 858-59.
62. Id. at 859.
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Commission set forth in its first guidelines manual.63
In a per curiam decision, the Fourth Circuit disagreed. Allegheny had fully
and promptly paid the maximum fine of $1 million, and the court labeled the
rest of the sentence "a nullity.',6 Judge Doumar had overstepped his authority,
for under the Sherman Act, "there are no additional or alternate sanctions which
would even suggest imprisonment or probation of a corporation. '6 Ordering
the district court to remove all of Allegheny's sentence except the fine, the
court of appeals remanded the case. Judge Doumar's expansive view of permis-
sible corporate punishment, and the Fourth Circuit's cursory rejection of that
view, illustrates the need for clear corporate sentencing principles.
C. The New Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
Having promulgated sentencing guidelines for individual defendants, the
Commission began serious discussion of organizational sentencing in July 1988
by circulating two proposals. One proposal emphasized monetary sanctions, and
fines in particular.66 This proposal treated corporate probation primarily as a
means of securing payment of fines or restitution. 7 The other proposal urged
the Commission to "treat... probation as a frequently desirable means to
secure continuing judicial control over organizational offenders and thereby
promote organizational reform following a serious offense.'6 8 Controversy
erupted: businesses and corporate law firms pressed for lighter fines and less
intrusive probation, while environmental and other public interest groups
lobbied for stiffer penalties and greater oversight of corporate behavior.69 On
April 26, 1991, less than a week before the May 1 statutory deadline and
almost three years after circulating its first proposed guidelines, the Commission
sent a final draft to Congress.70 Because Congress did not exercise its authori-
ty to intervene, these guidelines became effective on November 1, 1991.1
63. Id. at 863 (citing U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 1.1). Curiously, after stating that the corporate sentence
was "specifically tailored" to these four goals of sentencing, Judge Doumar only discussed incapacitation
and deterrence; he never elaborated on his claim that the punishment comported with rehabilitation and just
punishment. See id.
64. United States v. Harford, 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,386, at 60,133 (4th Cir. 1989).
65. Id. (citing Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271 (1959) (corporation cannot be
imprisoned)).
66. U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 1 (draft developed by Commissioner Michael Block and
Deputy Chief Counsel Jeffrey Parker).
67. Id. § 8D2.1, at 64.
68. Richard Gruner, Special Issue on Organizational Sanctions: Introduction, 10 WHr=rrR L. REV.
1, 3 (1988) (discussing proposal coauthored with Coffee and Stone, see Coffee et al., supra note 1).
69. See Stanley S. Arkin, Corporate Sentencing Guidelines-Again, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 11, 1990, at 3; Fred
Strasser et al., The Corporate Sentencing Fight is Postponed, NAT'L L.., Apr. 23, 1990, at 5; Fred Strasser,
Corporate Sentences Draw Fire; Big Business Attacks Proposals, NAT' LJ., Mar. 12, 1990, at 3.
70. Guideline Amendments, supra note 3; Organizational Sentencing Guidelines Adopted by Federal
Sentencing Commission, 59 U.S.L.W. 2661 (May 7, 1991) [hereinafter Guidelines Adopted]. Amendments
to the Sentencing Guidelines must be sent to Congress before May 1 of each year to take effect in that year.
28 U.S.C. § 9 9 4 (p) (1988).
71. See Congress Has No Plans To Review Corporate Crime, CORP. FIN. WK., Oct. 7, 1991, at 9.
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The new guidelines significantly increase the size of the fines courts may
impose against corporate offenders. At one extreme, if the sentencing court
determines that the defendant "operated primarily for a criminal purpose or
primarily by criminal means," then the guidelines require a fine "sufficient to
divest the organization of all its net assets."'72 This sort of corporate death
penalty will apply only where the defendant has essentially no legitimate
business operations.73 Yet the rationale behind the divestment provision-that
the size of the fine should track the "seriousness" of the offense-underlies the
remaining guidelines for fines as well. The "base fine" imposed reflects the
seriousness of the offense by requiring the organization to pay the greater of
the fine set by the guidelines' offense-level table, the defendant's monetary
gain, or the monetary loss caused by the offense if caused "intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly."74 The court may then increase or decrease this
dollar figure by taking into account various "culpability" factors.75 The maxi-
mum fine within these guidelines could reach as high as $290 million, easily
outdistancing pre-guidelines fine levels.76
In addition, the guidelines specifically provide for restitution,77 remedial
orders, 78 community service,79 and orders of notice to victims.80 These sanc-
tions are all designed to promote a general principle of corporate punishment
----"that the organization take all appropriate steps to provide compensation to
victims and otherwise remedy the harm caused or threatened by the offense.,
81
Likewise, all four sanctions may be imposed as conditions of probation.
The guidelines include a broad scheme of mandatory corporate probation.
They require the use of probation if necessary to ensure the defendant compa-
72. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8C1.1.
73. Id. 8 8Cl.1 cmt. (listing organizations set up to commit fraud, drug rings, and "hazardous waste
disposal business that had no legitimate means of disposing of hazardous waste" as type of defendants
prompting divestment).
74. Id. § 8C2.4.
75. These factors include: the company's degree of "involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity";
any prior history of similar misconduct; violation of a judicial order, injunction, or condition of probation;
obstruction of justice; the use of an "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law"; and "self-
reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of responsibility." Id. § 8C2.5.
76. One noteworthy study of corporate punishment in 1984-87 found only two fines in excess of
$500,000; the highest fine imposed was $3.6 million. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 611; cf. Stanley S. Arkin,
Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y. U., June 13, 1991, at 3 (noting "average penalty for convicted
corporations is likely to rise dramatically" under new guidelines). Moreover, a company may have to pay
restitution to victims of the offense in addition to the fine. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3556, 3663(a) (1988).
These new fines do not apply to environmental, wildlife, food and drug, or civil rights offenses. See
U.S.S.G., supra note 4, §§ 8AI.1 cmt., 8C2.1 & cmt. Although the remainder of the new guidelines-the
provisions pertaining to probation, restitution, community service, and notice to victims--do apply to these
offenses, the Commission has not set fine levels for organizational violations of these laws. Instead,
sentencing courts have discretion within the general principles of the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553, 3572 (1988). See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8C2.10.
77. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8B1.1.
78. Id. § 8B 1.2.
79. Id. § 8B1.3.
80. Id. § 8B1.4.
81. Id. ch. 8, pt. B, intro. cmt.
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ny's compliance with some other sanction, such as a fine, restitution, a remedial
order, or community service.8 2 Probation is also required if in the five years
before sentencing, the organization, or a "high-level" individual within it,
engaged in "similar misconduct. '8 3
Perhaps most significantly, the guidelines mandate the use of probation if
the company "does not have an effective program to prevent and detect viola-
tions of law."''s Such a program must satisfy a rigorous checklist requiring "at
a minimum": (1) compliance standards and procedures; (2) specific high-
ranking executives assigned to oversee compliance; (3) no delegation to em-
ployees "whom the organization knew, or should have known through the
exercise of due diligence, had a propensity to engage in illegal activities";
(4) compliance training programs or publications for all employees; (5) channels
for whistleblowers to report misconduct "without fear of retribution"; (6) the
use of disciplinary mechanisms against individuals responsible for offenses or
who failed to detect offenses; and (7) a response of "all reasonable steps" to
any offenses detected." The guidelines add that "[tihe larger the organization,
the more formal the program typically should be," that certain sorts of business-
es may include a greater risk of offenses requiring increased safeguards, and
that recurrence of similar misconduct should weigh against a finding of an
"effective" compliance program.8 6 Finally, the guidelines include two catchall
provisions that require probation if "necessary to ensure that changes are made
within the organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct, ' 7
or "to accomplish one or more of the purposes of sentencing set forth in [theSPA]."8
The guidelines include both mandatory and discretionary conditions of
probation. In keeping with the SRA, the sentencing court must require every
probationer not to commit another federal, state, or local crime while on
probation.8 9 If the underlying offense was a felony, the court must order the
company to pay a fine, pay restitution, or perform community service in
addition to, and as a condition of, probation.90
82. Id. § 8D1.l(aXl)-(2). Indeed, probation is required if the organization has not paid all monetary
penalties "in full at the time of sentencing, and restrictions are necessary to safeguard the organization's
ability to make payments." Id. § 8DI.I(aX2). This provision alone is likely to lead to frequent use of
probation. See Toensing, supra note 5, at 22 ("Non-payment at that stage [the time of sentencing] will, of
course, be commonplace:"). In addition, probation is mandatory in all instances where the court has imposed
no fine. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c) (1988); U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8DI.l(aX7).
83. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8DI.I(aX4)-(5).
84. Id. § 8Dl.l(a)(3).
85. Id. § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(k).
86. Id. § 8A1.2 cmL 3(k)(7)(i)-(iii).
87. Id. § 8DI.I(aX6).
88. Id. § 8D1.1(a)(8) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1985)). The SRA's sentencing purposes are quoted
in Part II.B.1, supra. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44; cf. infra Part EI.A (discussing ways in
which corporate probation under guidelines undermines SRA's purposes).
89. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8D1.3(a).
90. Id. § 8D1.3(b).
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The guidelines also permit the court to impose a wide variety of other
conditions. First, the court may order the company to publicize, at its own
expense, the nature of the offense, the conviction, the sentence imposed, and
the steps it will take to prevent recurrence.9' Second, the court may demand
that the company make "periodic submissions" to the court or a designated
probation officer detailing the company's financial condition and the results of
its business operations, including an accounting for all revenue.92 Third, the
court may force the company to submit to "regular or unannounced exam-
inations of its books and records" and the "interrogation" of its officials. 93 The
guidelines delegate this monitoring responsibility to probation officers or court-
appointed experts, paid for by the corporate probationer itself. Fourth, the court
may require immediate notification concerning any adverse change in the
company's financial condition or prospects, and the commencement of any
proceeding or investigation against the organization. 94 Finally, the court may
require the organization to develop and submit a compliance program and a
schedule for its implementation. 95 If the court approves the program, the
company must alert its employees and shareholders to the criminal behavior
and the implementation of the compliance program, and must make "periodic
reports" to the court or probation officer concerning the program's progress.96
The guidelines supplement these conditions by granting discretion to impose
others, although cautioning that these other conditions must be "reasonably
related to the nature and circumstances of the offense or the history and charac-
teristics of the organization" and "involve only such deprivations of liberty or
property as are necessary to effect the purposes of sentencing."97
Probation under the guidelines may last up to five years and must last at
least one year for felonies. 98 During that time, the court may punish probation
violations by extending the term, increasing the restrictiveness of the conditions,
revoking probation and resentencing the organization, or "in the event of
repeated, serious violations," appointing a trustee to oversee compliance.99
III. ASSESSING PROBATION UNDER THE NEW GUIDELINES
The new guidelines' corporate probation provisions are comprehensive and
ambitious, yet flawed. This part examines the provisions against the backdrop
of their statutory mandate and in juxtaposition with existing administrative and
91. Id. § 8D1.4(a).
92. Id. § 8D1.4(bX1).
93. Id. J 8DI.4(bX2).
94. Id. § 8D1.4(b)(3).
95. Id. § 8D1.4(cXl).
96. Id. § 8D1.4(cX2)-(3).
97. Id. § 8DI.3(c).
98. Id. § 8D1.2.
99. Id. § 8D1.5 & cmt.
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civil enforcement mechanisms.
A. Promotion of the Sentencing Reform Act's Stated Purposes
An important measure of the legitimacy of the new guidelines' probation
provisions lies in the degree to which they promote the SRA's sentencing
purposes. As previously noted, these purposes are codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)"° and must be considered by a judge when designing probationary
conditions. °1 Essentially, the SRA requires corporate probation to further six
objectives: (1) "just punishment"; 0 2 (2) deterrence;' 03 (3) incapacitation;' 0"
(4) rehabilitation; 0 5 (5) detenninacy;106 and (6) restitution to victims. 107 Sen-
tencing under the new guidelines does not require a choice between these
philosophical objectives, for the SRA "has deliberately not shown a preference
for one purpose of sentencing over another."' ' 8
1. "Just Punishment"
Under this principle, a company's sentence should reflect its "just
deserts."' ' This "just deserts" notion draws from the traditional concept of
retribution"0 but stresses proportionality: the sentence imposed should reflect
the seriousness of the offense."' The seriousness of an offense, in turn, stems
from two elements: the amount of harm caused and the offender's degree of
culpability.12
In most situations under the guidelines, corporate fines and restitution will
closely reflect a company's "just deserts." When a court imposes a fine on an
100. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (quoting SRA).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (1988); cf. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 42, at 74-75, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3257-58 ("One of the most glaring defects in current [pre-SRA] sentencing law is the
absence of general legislative guidance concerning the factors to be considered in imposing sentence.").
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (1988).
103. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
104. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
105. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
106. See id. § 3553(a)(6).
107. See id. § 3553(a)(7).
108. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 42, at 77, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3260.
109. See id. at 75, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3258 (describing § 3553(a)(2)(A) as "essentially
the 'just deserts' concepf).
110. 3 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18-8 (2d ed. 1980) ("[R]etribution should provide
not a justification but a limit .... a ceiling on punishment that may not be exceeded on utilitarian
grounds."); cf. Exodus 21:24 ("eye for eye, tooth for tooth').
111. See, e.g., ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 11 (1975) ("Justice... weighs the
gravity of the crime on her scales to reestablish the equilibrium disturbed by the offense through an equally
weighty punishment."); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHmENTS 66 (1976)
("Severity of punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the wrong.") (emphasis omitted);
cf. Richard Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 L LEGAL STUD. 71 (1980) (retribu-
tion is consistent with economic theory of punishment).
112. E.g., VON HIRSCH, supra note 111, at 79-81.
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organization, it must calculate the level of that fine based on the harm caused
by the offense but adjusted substantially to reflect the corporation's culpabili-
ty.113 For example, a large defense contractor convicted of procurement fraud
would pay, in addition to restitution, a fine based on the amount of the harm
caused, increased by factors such as significant planning, involvement of senior
management, and any efforts to conceal detection.
In contrast, three principal types of probation are possible under the guide-
lines, but only the first promotes "just deserts." The first variety makes payment
of a fine or restitution a condition of probation; it simply increases the conse-
quences of noncompliance with these monetary sanctions." 4 Here the mone-
tary penalty is the proportionate sanction, and probation merely plays a sup-
porting role. Probation of this sort is entirely consistent with the SRA." 5 The
second variety makes adverse publicity a condition of probation.'1 6 Here, the
embarrassment and stigma of the publicity are imposed as the company's "just
deserts" for its criminal behavior.17 Such probationary conditions are retribu-
tive but less likely to be proportionate than are monetary conditions because
the "size" or gravity of the adverse publicity order is less certain and less
quantifiable."8 The retributive force of such probation depends on "the fickle
jury of public opinion.""' 9 The third variety uses the probation itself as the
primary punishment, imposing substantial constraints on corporate autonomy.
Provisions requiring the company to develop a compliance program under the
court's and probation officer's close supervision are more forward looking than
retributive. In most instances, such intervention mirrors the amount of harm and
the degree of culpability less precisely than fines and restitution do. The rare,
but important, exception is the recidivist company. That context could justify
significant monitoring through probation because the company has been so
delinquent as to "deserve" the most drastic sanctions available. Except in such
extraordinary situations, fines provide "just punishment" more precisely than
probation does.
113. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, §§ 8C2.4-8C2.5; supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. Fines
under the guidelines pay close attention to the size of the organization in assessing culpability; the probation
guidelines, in contrast, virtually ignore the size of the organization. Compare U.S.S.G., supra note 4,
§ 8C2.5(b) (culpability adjustment varies with five different size levels of organizations) with id. § 8D 1.1(3)
(organization of fewer than 50 employees not required to have compliance program).
114. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8D1.l(a)(l)-(2); supra notes 82, 90 and accompanying text.
115. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(bX2)-(3) (1988).
116. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8DIA(a); supra text accompanying note 91.
117. The adverse publicity sanction is advocated at length in BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE
IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983); Brent Fisse, The Use of Publicity as a Criminal
Sanction Against Business Corporations, 8 MELB. U. L. REV. 107 (1971).
118. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 18, at 427 ("Adverse publicity is something of a loose cannon; its
exact impact cannot be reliably estimated nor is it controllable so that only the guilty are affected."). Even
Coffee, no enthusiast of cash fines, concedes that "it seems easier to rely on even cash fines in preference
to the wholly unpredictable impact of a legal stigma." Id. at 428. Moreover, "the civil law can also achieve
the[] goals [of publicity] ... with less effort and greater precision" through corrective advertising orders
and the like. Id.
119. Fisse, supra note 18, at 1231.
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2. Deterrence
Deterrence features prominently in both the Economic and the Structural
Reform Models" and represents the most significant objective in corporate
punishment 121 Essentially, deterrence rests on consequentialist grounds: a
punishment should increase the expected costs of the crime until they outweigh
its expected benefits."2 To the extent that businesses are more likely than
other offenders to make decisions along cost-benefit lines, deterrence is particu-
larly well suited to corporate crime."
Generally, corporate probation under the new guidelines will deter, but less
efficiently and less predictably than will fines and restitution. The prospect of
unannounced examinations of their books and interrogations of their employ-
ees'Z may frighten companies into trying harder to obey the law. Companies
may react similarly to the risk of having a court and its appointed "experts"
monitor and review their internal compliance programs.125 The threat of ad-
verse publicity provided at company expense may be similarly daunting."
Yet the deterrent effect of each of these conditions of probation lies only
in their financial implications. Companies will fear each sanction because of
its expense and, especially, because of the unpredictability of that expense. "No
matter what form the penalty takes, its ultimate impact on the organization is
likely to be evaluated in monetary or economic terms-by investors, competi-
tors, and others-because financial results are the only purpose of the organiza-
tion and the only measure of its performance in the marketplace."1 27 If com-
panies overestimate the costs of probation, they will be overdeterred: they will
spend more money on compliance mechanisms than needed to detect and
120. Compare POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 11, at 205-11 (arguing that monetary sanc-
tions can deter offender by making expected punishment costs prohibitively high) with Coffee, supra note
18, at 388-407 (advocating intervention because cash fines are inadequate to deter corporate crime).
121. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 42, at 76, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3259 (describing
deterrence as "particularly important in the area of white collar crime").
122. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 11, at 205-11. "Special" deterrence refers
to the deterrence of the particular offender; "general" deterrence describes the deterrence of other potential
offenders as well. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKiNs, DEERRENCE 72-74 (1973).
123. See, e.g., PACKER, supra note 14, at 356 (suggesting sole use of criminal sanction in area of
economic offenses is deterrence); Developments, supra note 14, at 1235-36 ("Since corporate activity is
normally undertaken in order to reap some economic benefit, corporate decisionmakers choose courses of
action based on a calculation of potential costs and benefits. The calculating criminal is the one best deterred
by punitive sanctions." (footnote omitted)).
124. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8D1.4(b)(2), (c)(4).
125. For provisions for the appointment and payment of experts, see U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8D1.4-
(b)(2), (c)(4).
126. For guidelines providing for company-sponsored adverse publicity, see id. § 8DI.4(a). But see
PACKER, supra note 14, at 361 (finding "very little evidence to suggest that the stigma of criminality means
anything very substantial in the life of a corporation"); Comment, supra note 27, at 287-89 n.35 (questioning
effectiveness of "moral opprobium" on corporate crime).
127. Parker, supra note 11, at 571.
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prevent misconduct, diverting money from value-maximizing transactions m
In contrast, monetary conditions of probation such as fines and restitution are
more easily predicted, and-if sufficiently high-can more precisely deter.
Similarly, where probation conditions weaken a company's financial status,
shareholders may have trouble ascertaining whether existing management's, the
court's, the probation officer's, or a court-appointed expert's decisions are
responsible. These same problems do not characterize the effects of fines and
restitution on the value of a company's stock. Shareholders can easily perceive
the connection between a hefty fine and falling share value and exercise their
prerogatives-to sell or to hold the stock or to vote against management-in
a more rational manner.
3. Incapacitation
The SRA's third purpose is to protect the public from further wrongdoing
by the particular offender.'29 This punishment objective focuses heavily on
recidivists; it purports to identify the particular offenders most likely to commit
additional offenses and to prevent them from doing so. 30 Some commentators
do not consider incapacitation, which usually means incarceration for individual
defendants, applicable to corporate criminals.' 3' Yet to the extent that incapac-
itation simply involves preventive, restraining measures, corporate behavior is
restricted.32
Probation under the new guidelines includes some of the most incapacitat-
ing corporate sanctions available. A particularly restrictive form of probation
requires a monitoring officer to review and investigate the company's compli-
ance programs 33 and puts the company's decisionmaking under close supervi-
sion of the court or its officers.'3 Indeed, other than incapacitation through
128. Id. at 573 ("Spending more than the optimal amount of resources on control increases the amount
of harm from organizational crime by making control more harmful than the crime itself.").
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(aX2XC) (1988).
130. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 225, supra note 42, at 76, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3259; VON
HIRSCH, supra note I11, at 19 (describing this function of punishment as "predictive restraint').
131. See, e.g., PACKER, supra note 14, at 356; Developments, supra note 14, at 1235.
132. Consider, for example, Judge Doumar's discussion of corporate "imprisonmen ' in the Allegheny
Bottling case. See United States v. Allegheny Bottling Co., 695 F. Supp. 856,859-61 (E.D. Va. 1988), affid
in part & rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Harford, 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,386 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989); supra text accompanying notes 56-63; see also Donald R. Richberg, The
Imprisonment of Criminal Corporations, 18 CASE & COM. 527 (1912) (suggesting form of receivership as
corporate imprisonment).
Senate bills authorizing incapacitating measures such as the suspension or restriction of a convicted
company's participation in interstate commerce have failed. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 42, at 68-69,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3251-52 (discussing rejection of S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-4AI(c)(1)
(1973) (authorizing suspension of organization's right to participate in interstate or foreign commerce), and
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2103(b)(6) (1977) (authorizing condition of probation restraining participa-
tion in specified business "bearing a reasonable relationship to the offense"), because too likely to unduly
burden otherwise legitimate business).
133. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8DI.4(b)(2), (c)(3).
134. Id. § 8DI.4(bX3), (c)(4).
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the corporate "death penalty,, 135 probationary conditions of this sort are per-
haps the most incapacitating sanction in the new guidelines. While probation
for individuals offers "a conditional loss of liberty,' '136 supervised structural
reform of companies through probation involves an actual loss of liberty, not
a conditional one. In this way, corporate probation conditions imposing structur-
al controls137 closely parallel incarceration, not probation, for individual
criminals. In contrast, "supportive" corporate probation does involve only a
"conditional loss of liberty": if the company fails to comply with the monetary
or remedial conditions, it will lose its liberty, and the less intrusive sort of
probation will be revoked and replaced with the more invasive variety. 31
Consistency with incapacitation principles suggests that recidivist companies
and companies that violate terms of probation should be the targets of the more
burdensome probation. The new guidelines, however, conflate intrusive and
supportive corporate probation by failing to distinguish the circumstances in
which each sort is appropriate.
4. Rehabilitation
Although the SRA lists rehabilitation as a sentencing objective, it deempha-
sizes this goal by rejecting the "outmoded rehabilitation model," which had
served as the primary justification for previous sentencing schemes, including
the Federal Probation Act. 139 Moreover, the SRA's language of rehabilitation
seems plainly inapplicable to organizations; it cites an aim "to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment."'14 Underlying the rehabilitative ideal is the notion that
the criminal law can reform defendants to make them law-abiding.141 At one
level, rehabilitation of corporate offenders seeks to reform the responsible
individuals within the organizations. For that purpose, the use of corporate
probation-or of corporate sanctions at all, for that matter-seems misguided.
Yet proponents of the Structural Reform Model envision a different sort of
135. The guidelines provide for maximum fines sufficient to divest a company of all of its net assets.
See id. § 8C1.1; see also Guidelines Adopted, supra note 70, at 2661 (describing § 8C1.1 as "the organiza-
tional equivalent of the death penalty").
136. PACKER, supra note 14, at 275.
137. See Leonard Orland, Corporate Punishment By the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 4 FED. SENTENC-
ING REP. 50, 50 (1991); cf. Letter from Jon V. Heider & Thomas B. Leary, The Business Roundtable, to
Judge W'dliam W. Wilkins, Jr., chairman of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and members of the
Commission 8 (Sept. 27, 1990) (on file with author) (characterizing corporate probation as "an extraordinary
remedy which should be imposed only to meet a specific need").
138. If the company fails to comply with these conditions, the court may modify the terms of probation
to make them more intrusive. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8D1.5.
139. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 42, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221; Harvey M.
Silets & Susan W. Brenner, The Demise of Rehabilitation: Sentencing Reform and the Sanctioning of
Organizational Criminality, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 329, 371 (1986).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (1988); see also Silets & Brenner, supra note 139, at 363 ("Obviously,
the fourth factor [§ 3553(a)(2)(D)] is inapplicable to the corporate defendant.").
141. See, e.g., VON HIRSCH, supra note 111, at 11 n.*.
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corporate rehabilitation: the reform of companies' internal control and commu-
nication systems, ensuring that subordinate employees follow the plans of upper
management and that information about subordinate employees' conduct is
transmitted back to management.142
In most circumstances, probation under the new guidelines will promote
such corporate rehabilitation less efficiently than fines will. It seems hard to
quarrel with the notion that companies with inadequate internal control and
communication systems should reform them. But those most familiar with the
quirks of a company's structure, long-range goals, customers, creditors, and
financial status are usually in the best position to see how to reform the firm's
incentive, communication, and compliance mechanisms. Surely the organization
itself is usually best equipped to make such rehabilitative changes cost-effec-
tively.143 Fines under the new guidelines provide incentives for such reform
in the form of mitigating factors for compliance efforts. 44 Moreover, a 1991
study suggests that most companies react to monetary penalties by instituting
reforms; the others go out of business. 45 In extraordinary circumstances,
however, significant structural defects may hinder a company's ability to
respond to the incentives and disincentives created by the new fines under the
guidelines. A recidivist company will have failed to implement reforms fully
in response to monetary sanctions. In that scenario, closely supervised rehabili-
tation seems warranted. The guidelines do not limit structural probation to such
instances; they should. Society can usually best achieve the often-legitimate end
of corporate rehabilitation without judicial oversight by using monetary sanc-
tions and monetary conditions of probation, rather than court intervention in
corporate governance.
5. Determinacy
Determinate sentencing "underline[s] the major premise of the sentencing
142. See, e.g., James A. Geraghty, Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation: A New
Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 YALE LJ. 353 (1979).
143. See POSNPR, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 11, at 397-98; Parker, supra note 11, at 573; cf.
Gruner, supra note 18, at 80-85 (recognizing efficiency advantages of corporate monitoring as opposed to
governmental monitoring).
144. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8C2.5(f); Arkin, supra note 76, at 4 (arguing that fines under
guidelines will increase compliance efforts, for such efforts "could result in a modest fine rather than a
ruinous one.").
145. See SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ABA, FINAL REPORT: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CONVICTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS 80-82, 107-08 (1991). Based on federal prosecutions of the last two years,
the ABA study found that 75% of the convicted corporations surveyed were still in operation. Id. at 107.
Of those, in response to their convictions, 59% had initiated or expanded a prevention program, 57% had
implemented or expanded a surveillance program, 41% had replaced senior management, 29% had replaced
middle management, 26% had implemented a new accounting system, 16% had initiated or expanded a peer-
review process, and 10% had fired everyone responsible. Id. at 108. Which sanctions prompted these
companies to react in these ways? Fines were imposed in 91% of the cases. Id. at 80; cf. Feder, supra note
28, at F5 ("Companies are fighting the high cost of misconduct with ethics programs." (emphasis added)).
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guidelines-the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity."' 46 Congress
enacted the SRA largely in response to complaints about the unfettered sentenc-
ing discretion of federal district judges and parole officers. 47 Consistency and
predictability are desirable features of a sentencing scheme on both conse-
quentialist and retributive grounds: these features foster a more accurate
cost/benefit analysis by the potential criminal, enhancing deterrence; they also
fit with notions of "fairness" by treating similarly culpable defendants similarly.
The provisions for corporate probation under the new guidelines undermine
the SRA's commitment to determinacy by leaving considerable room for
variation among probationary conditions, while purporting to curb judicial
discretion. By following the "if X, then Y" format of the guidelines, a judge
imposes sentences that seem mechanical and predetermined. Yet the new
guidelines give judges insufficient guidance in assessing both when to put a
corporation on probation and what conditions to impose.
Three triggers of probation under the new guidelines encompass enough
situations to swallow the usefulness of probation guidelines: (1) the need "to
accomplish one or more of the purposes of sentencing"; 141 (2) the need "to
ensure that changes are made within the organization to reduce the likelihood
of future criminal conduct"; 149 and (3) the occurrence of "similar misconduct"
by the company or a high-level official within the last five years.15' These
triggers rely heavily on the judge's interpretation of ambiguous language and
transfer significant power to the prosecutor. First, the judge receives little guid-
ance from the question-begging provision that authorizes probation whenever
"necessary to accomplish one or more of the purposes of sentencing.' 5'
Second, the judge's assessment of the adequacy of a company's compliance
efforts or the likelihood of future misconduct will depend largely on the
prosecutor's characterization of the same. Hence, plea and charge bargaining
outside of the judge's presence will increase, as prosecutors wield considerable
leverage because of their ability to influence the judge's decision whether to
subject a company to invasive supervision.'52 In this way, what discretion the
guidelines take away from the judge they award to the prosecutor.53 And
146. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 42, at 78, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3261.
147. Id. at 49-50, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3232-33.
148. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8D1.l(a)(8).
149. Id. § 8D1.l(a)(6).
150. Id. § 8D1.l(a)(4)-(5).
151. Id. § 8D1.1(a)(8).
152. Cf. Hearings on the Sentencing Guidelines Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 816-36 (1987) (statement of Prof. Albert Alschuler)
(discussing prosecutor's plea and charge bargaining leverage stemming from guidelines' incarceration
provisions for individuals).
153. Cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231,256-88 (1989) (discussing ways in which
prosecutorial discretion, through plea, guideline-factor, and charge bargaining, can undermine sentencing
guidelines); Peter B. Pope, Note, How Unreliable Factfinding Can Undermine Sentencing Guidelines, 95
YALE LJ. 1258 (1986) (arguing that guidelines conceal factfinding problems). See generally ABRAHAM S.
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where the SRA requires the judge to consider determinacy, the Department of
Justice Manual imposes no such restriction. 154 Third, where the guidelines
do provide more specific guidance, they point to factors that may implicate
almost every sizable corporate defendant. Under the guidelines' idea of "similar
misconduct," for instance, all sorts of fraud (e.g., medicare, securities, consum-
er) are considered "similar,"155 even though compliance programs targeting
the different types of fraud must address different divisions, different employ-
ees, different scenarios, and different victims. In sum, the guidelines provide
little meaningful differentiation between appropriate and inappropriate occasions
for corporate probation.
Similarly, once a judge deems corporate probation appropriate under the
guidelines, he has little help in designing the conditions. For example, a judge
making adverse publicity a condition of probation1 56 has no guidance on the
media to specify, the amount the company must spend, the size of the cam-
paign, or the degree to which the company may include other messages in the
advertisements. The "loose cannon" problems identified by commentators seem
alive and well in this part of the guidelines. 57
6. Restitution
The SRA includes restitution as a sentencing goal.5 This goal, tradition-
ally one of civil law,159 had previously been available only as a condition of
probation.' 6" Restitution is now an independent sentence,' 6 1 although it may
also function as a condition of probation under the guidelines. 62 By adding
the threat of probation revocation, a sentencing court can increase the conse-
quences that a company faces for failing to make ordered restitution. Structural
GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA (1981).
154. Department of Justice policy calls for prosecutors to consider several factors; determinate
sentencing is not one of them. See 8 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 740
& cmt., at 9-545 to 9-547 (Supp. 1990-2) (listing considerations for sentencing recommendations). A
prosecutor may make sentencing recommendations, including "innovative conditions of probation," whenever
"[t]he public interest warrants an expression of the government's view concerning the appropriate sentence."
Id. § 730 & cmt., at 9-543 to 9-545.
155. U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8AI.2 cmL. 3(0.
156. Id. § 8DI.4(a).
157. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 18, at 424-34 (discussing problems of adverse publicity sanctions).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(aX7) (1988).
159. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in the Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss.
L.J. 515, 521 (1982) (noting "restitution [in the criminal process] came into vogue in the United States...
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as part of the increasing emphasis on rehabilitation").
The difficulty of distinguishing between such criminal sanctions and civil ones is beyond the scope of this
Note and is discussed at length elsewhere. See generally Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The
Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE LJ. 1795 (1992) (describing restitution as
paridigmatic purpose of civil law, yet noting collapsing distinction between civil and criminal paradigms).
160. See United States v. RICO Indus., 854 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1988) (corporation cannot be ordered
to pay restitution unless sentenced to probation), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989).
161. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664 (1988).
162. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, §§ 8BI.l, 8Dl.l(a)(1).
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reform through probationary monitoring need play little role if restitution is the
primary purpose and if the corporate defendant can pay. Probation can be
useful, however, as a threat with which to ensure compliance by a corporation
sentenced to pay restitution as its main condition of probation.
B. Juxtaposition with Administrative and Civil Enforcement Mechanisms
The discussion thus far has focused on the problems and dangers of the
new corporate probation guidelines. A comparison of these provisions with
available administrative and civil enforcement mechanisms raises an additional
question: What can corporate probation accomplish that cannot already be
achieved through these other channels? A wide array of nonmonetary corrective
sanctions function much like probation of the structural reform variety. The
Department of Defense may debar or suspend contractors;163 the FDIC may
issue cease-and-desist orders, suspend an institution's insurance, or place it in
conservatorship or receivership; 64 the SEC has broad injunctive and cease-
and-desist powers, and the authority to suspend companies from the securities
industry; 165 the Department of Health and Human Services may exclude
health care providers from medicare and medicaid programs; 166 the EPA has
broad injunctive and debarment authority;' 67 the FDA may obtain injunctions
or seize adulterated or misbranded products; 6 the FTC may obtain injunc-
tions, cease-and-desist orders, and orders correcting false advertising; 69 and
so on.
70
163. See Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.403, 9.406-4(a), 9.407-4(a)-(b) (1990). The
presence of "reasonable procedures designed to prevent and detect violations" may help a contractor avoid
debarment. Id. §§ 3.502-2(i)(1), 9.406-1(a).
164. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1786, 1818 (1988 & Supp. 11989).
165. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1988); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78o(bX4)-(6), 78u(d)-(e) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e)-(k) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991); SEC v. 1=, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 96,948, at 95,959-63 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 1979) (corporation agreed to take specified steps to prevent
future securities violations).
166. See Medicare and Medicaid Patients and Program Protection Act of 1987,42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7
(1988 & Supp. 11989); 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001.1 to 1004.130 (1991).
167. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136d (1988); Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2606, 2616 (1988); Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a), 1415 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j(e)
(1988); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4910 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(a)(1), 6973 (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1988);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9606
(1988).
168. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 332, 334 (1988).
169. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b),Q) (1988); see also Warner-Lambert Co.
v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 763-64 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (upholding corrective advertising order against First
Amendment challenge), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
170. The agencies listed have authority to punish about 70% of corporate crimes: procurement and
program fraud, banking crimes, securities fraud, medicare and medicaid fraud, environmental offenses, food
and drug violations, antitrust offenses, and consumer fraud. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Empirical Trends
in Corporate Crime and Punishment, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 121 (1990); Parker, supra note 11, at 530-31
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The existence of such mechanisms in the absence of the corporate probation
guidelines has conflicting implications. On the one hand, probation seems less
problematic if such interventionist devices are already acceptable in the legal
system. On the other hand, probation seems redundant if these other weapons
are available. The redundancy argument prevails because the administrative and
civil processes hold two distinct advantages over probation. First, a court or
probation officer monitoring a company's compliance with a particular regulato-
ry regime has neither the resources nor the expertise of the administrative
agency charged with enforcing the laws in question.17' The FDA, for instance,
will be far better at gauging a company's program for preventing and detecting
food and drug violations than a court will. Indeed, relying on the agency for
such oversight is consistent with its mandate; relying on the court to do the
same adds significantly to its already overflowing docket. 72 Nor will delegat-
ing the monitoring to a court-appointed expert solve this problem. Although
the company on probation would pay the expert's expenses and fee,173 this
is hardly an efficient allocation of resources: it is more cost effective for the
company to implement or expand its own program or to have an agency already
monitoring the industry increase its scrutiny. The court, moreover, will still
have to spend time reviewing the expert's findings and recommendations and
settling disputes between the company and the expert. Second, the agency has
a more precisely defined jurisdiction. EPA officials may supervise a company's
environmental controls, but not its marketing procedures or compliance with
the federal securities laws. In contrast, a judge or probation officer receives
much less guidance as to which corporate operations fall within his oversight
authority.
IV. LIMITING CORPORATE PROBATION: AMENDING THE GUIDELINES
The guidelines' corporate probation provisions need revision. The Commis-
sion should amend the guidelines to stress the extraordinary nature of this
sanction and the limited circumstances in which its application is justified. Such
restrictions would not eliminate the use of corporate probation; they would,
however, rescind the new guidelines' invitation to district courts to misapply
tbl. 3. This list is not exhaustive and does not include private actions seeking injunctive relief, state
processes, or civil enforcement by the Department of Justice.
171. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE LL 31, 80 (1991). Even Coffee acknowledges the inadequacy of the U.S. Probation Service to
gather facts on corporate criminals. See John C. Coffee Jr., Let's Not Shield Corporations From Criminal
Penalties, LEGAL TMEs, Feb. 13, 1989, at 19, 21.
172. The fear of agency "capture" by the industry it regulates might justify reliance on the more
insulated judicial branch for the monitoring of corporate offenders. Yet the actual risk of capture is in
question, see, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOvER1MENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY
Do IT 72-89 (1989), and the insulation of the judiciary has been challenged as well, see, e.g., Elhauge, supra
note 171, at 81-83 (interest groups may unduly influence judicial appointments).
173. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 8D1.4(b)(2), (c)(4).
1992] 2039
The Yale Law Journal
the sanction. There are four major elements to this revision.
First, the Commission should modify chapter eight's introductory commen-
tary, which sets forth "general principles" for the sentencing of organizations.
Part of this section invites courts to apply probation too often-whenever
needed "to ensure that steps will be taken within the organization to reduce the
likelihood of future criminal conduct."' 74 Instead, the Commission should
instruct courts that "probation may be appropriate for an organizational defen-
dant when needed to ensure that another sanction will be fully implemented or
when the organization has exhibited significant recidivism or disregard for
monetary sanctions." This would limit the use of corporate probation to enforc-
ing other sanctions, such as fines and restitution, and to addressing those
situations in which collectibility or marked recidivism is a problem.
Second, the Commission should amend section 8Dl.1, which lists eight
circumstances requiring the imposition of probation. This amendment would
both reduce the number of situations justifying the use of probation and add
a provision focusing on recidivists. The current list encompasses so many
situations that it invites probation whenever the court-heavily influenced by
the prosecutor---disapproves of a company's compliance program, 75 decides
future misconduct is likely, 76 or feels probation is appropriate "to accomplish
one or more of the purposes of sentencing.' ' 177 The Commission should leave
only two triggers, requiring probation (1) "if such sentence is necessary to
secure payment of restitution, enforce a remedial order, or ensure completion
of community service;, 17' and (2) if "restrictions are necessary to safeguard
an organization's ability to make payments.', 79 These triggers permit courts
to use probation as additional leverage to ensure compliance with monetary
sanctions and remedial orders and to ensure the collection of fines. Because this
section should address recidivism more directly, the Commission should add
a new section:
§ 8D1.6. Limitation on Imposition of Probation-Organizations
(a) The court shall not order a term of probation for any
reason other than those listed in § 8Dl.l(a), unless it
determines that a departure from the guidelines is warrant-
ed under § 8D1.6(b).
(b) Departure from § 8D1.6(a)'s limitation on the imposition
of probation may be warranted:
(1) if the organization has violated a condition of proba-
tion imposed either for the instant offense or for a
174. Id. ch. 8, intro. cmt.
175. Id. § 8Dl.l(a)(3).
176. Id. § 8Dl.l(a)(6).
177. Id. § 8Dl.1(a)(8).
178. Id. § 8Dl.l(a)(1) (references omitted).
179. Id. § 8Dl.1(a)(2).
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previous one; or
(2) if within the last five years, the organization has
been convicted of violating the same statute that it
has violated in the instant offense.
By stressing recidivism, this new section focuses the application of probation
on corporate offenders of the worst kind: those corporations that ignore the
lessons inflicted by monetary sanctions. At the same time, however, this section
defines recidivism narrowly to emphasize the exceptional nature of this kind
of corporate criminal. To justify probation on grounds of recidivism, a judge
would have to find circumstances so exceptional as to warrant departure from
the guidelines.1lW By making such a determination, the judge communicates
to both the convicted company and the public that the case warranted the
extreme measure of probation because it fell outside the "heartland" of typical
cases.
181
Third, the Commission should amend section 8D1.4, which lists various
conditions of probation. The changes here would more narrowly tailor condi-
tions of probation to the circumstances justifying probation in the first place.
To limit the use of the stigma sanction to recidivists, subsection (a), which
provides for adverse publicity orders, should now begin with the limiting
phrase: "If probation is imposed under § 8D1.6(b)." Subsection (b) provides
for probation where "necessary to safeguard the organization's ability to pay
any deferred portion of an order of restitution, fine, or assessment." This
subsection should remain intact, for it simply suggests conditions for situations
in which collectibility is seriously in question. Subsection (c), which lists condi-
tions for court monitoring of a company's compliance program, should now
apply only "if probation is imposed under § 8D1.6(b)," that is, only where
recidivism triggered the probation.
Finally, the Commission should amend the application note that accom-
panies section 8D1.4. An addition to this note would emphasize and clarify the
need for a reasonable relationship between the probationary supervision and the
nature of the offense. It should add a new paragraph: "When ordering an
organization to expand or implement a program to prevent and detect violations
of law, the court should restrict its order to those units and operations of the
organization that participated in the misconduct underlying the instant offense."
This addition would sternly remind courts and probation officers to try to "fix"
only the "broken" parts of corporate probationers.
180. Under 18 U.S.C. 3553(b) (1988), departure may be warranted if the court finds "that there exists
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
that described." Such departure mechanisms already exist as bases for other sanctions in the guidelines. See
U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 5K2 (grounds for departure from prison terms for individuals); id. §§ 8C4.2-.11
(grounds for departure from fines for organizations).
181. See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, ch.1, pt. A, intro. 4(b) (describing departure rationale).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Note has examined the guidelines' corporate probation provisions on
several fronts. Assessing the provisions against the SRA's purposes shows that
probation is less accurately retributive than monetary sanctions, unpredictable
in its deterrent and rehabilitative effects, approaching corporate imprisonment
in its incapacitating potential, and undermined by prosecutorial discretion and
ambiguous language. When juxtaposed with available administrative and civil
sanctions, corporate probation seems redundant and inefficient.
In light of these flaws, the Commission should amend the guidelines to
place a heavier emphasis on purely monetary sanctions: fines and restitution.
When imposed, probation conditions should be limited to those which guarantee
that the offender will comply with underlying monetary sanctions. Monitoring
through probation should apply only to judgment-proof and recidivist corpora-
tions. Finally, the Commission should restrict supervision and second-guessing
by courts and probation officers to only those corporate units and activities
involved in the offense of conviction. By limiting corporate probation in this
manner, the Commission will promote the purposes of punishment and avoid
imposing a judicially managed regulatory regime.
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